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1. Introduction
As we enter the 21st century the demand for a global equity market seems to be
growing. Investing institutions, investment banks and companies are already
increasingly global, and technology is pushing in that direction. There is however
a possible problem lurking in the wings: regulation. Already regulatory differences
are complicating the existence of a single European equity market as requirements
on accounting standards, provisions for disclosure or transparency rules all vary
hugely between markets. The need to better understand the relationship between
market structure and market quality is greater than ever in a EU seeking to construct
a single financial market.
One of the challenges regulators face is agreeing on the desired level of
transparency in stock exchange dealings.1 In the United States, Arthur Levitt,
who was chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) throughout
the Clinton presidency, devoted much time to improving standards of disclosure and
transparency in the equity markets. The view of the Commission is straightforward:
‘‘The Commission has long believed that transparency the real time, public
dissemination of trade and quotation information plays a fundamental role in the
fairness and efficiency of the secondary markets. . .transparency helps to link
dispersed markets and improves the price discovery, fairness, competitiveness and
attractiveness of US markets.’’2 In the same vein, the SEC also argued
‘‘. . .transparent disclosure of quotes and trades promotes best execution.’’3 In
contrast, in the UK, the Securities and Investment Board (SIB) has argued that there
are important differences between quotation transparency and trade transparency,
and that transparency (in the context of prompt publication of large trades) should
be restricted if it is necessary to assure adequate liquidity.4
The Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE) has made it clear that
real time reporting is basically state of the art and should be the standard in
Europe’s financial markets. It claims that reporting of ‘‘standard’’ trades at the end
of the day is not deemed sufficient.5 Nevertheless, markets with low degrees of
transparency seem to be doing quite well. In less than forty years, the Eurobond
market has gone from zero to becoming the second largest bond market in the world,
and the largest for corporate bonds. And that happened despite the market’s having
almost none of the characteristics which are claimed by some to be essential for a
1Real world trading systems exhibit considerable heterogeneity in the degree of transparency they offer.
Automated limit order book systems such as the type used by the Toronto Stock Exchange and the ParisBourse offer high degrees of transparency. Foreign exchange and corporate junk bond markets offer very
little transparency, whereas other dealer markets such as Nasdaq or the London Stock Exchange offer
moderate degrees of transparency (see Madhavan, 2000).
2See SEC Market 2000 Study, Chapter IV-1.
3See Release No. 34-36310; File No. S7-30-95.
4For a further discussion of these issues see Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999).
5Many non-exchange traded securities are traded in markets which are virtually opaque or dependent on
newsletter-like surveys for price discovery. Similarly, some derivatives are traded over-the-counter in
markets where trading information is not readily available as is the case with futures and options
exchanges.
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market which is fair and efficient for all. Compared to equity markets, its
transparency has been limited, and yet investors have received good returns over
many years and their confidence in the market has been steadfastly maintained. Is
there then a basis for imposing post trade transparency on transactions?
Transparency is generally regarded as central to influencing the liquidity and
quality of price formation. Changes in transparency regimes alter the information
sets of market participants, change their optimal behavior and hence influence the
price formation process. Prices, on the other hand, have an impact on not only the
fairness and efficiency of the markets, but also on their attractiveness. The economic
literature has shown steady interest in the welfare implications of transparency. It
has been a popular belief that open sharing of information is beneficial to market
participants. However, real life markets offer mixed evidence.6 How transparency
affects market behavior is a question addressed by several papers, which shows both
the importance and the complexity of this issue. Our contribution here is to delve
deeper into the effects of post trade transparency in the performance of the market
in a model based on Glosten and Milgrom (1985). We think that the study of this
issue within a well known framework may help in understanding its implications.
More precisely, we model a quote driven market in which the daily trade takes place
in two different intervals of time, whereas new information only arrives at the
beginning of the day. Using this set up we compare two market structures: a post
trade transparent market, in which trades are made public, and a post trade opaque
market, in which trades are not disclosed. In both market structures the information
contained in customer orders is valuable.7 To undertake the comparison we first
provide an explicit characterization and computation of dealers’ equilibrium pricing
strategies in the two market structures. This allows us to understand what the driving
forces behind dealers’ behavior are.
We show that prices in an opaque market result from the interplay between
informational and strategic considerations, whereas in a transparent market prices
are only informationally driven. Dealers operating in a transparent market set
regret free prices at each period making zero expected profits in each of the two
trading rounds. By contrast, dealers in an opaque market set prices away from the
short run equilibrium. We show that in the opaque market structure price setting
dealers invest in acquiring information by setting more attractive prices from
investors’ viewpoint at the beginning of the trading day. They depart from
maximizing current expected profits in order to produce information that will yield
6On one hand, most public B2B exchanges have found great difficulties in signing up suppliers.Furthermore, many firms have switched from public exchanges to private ones, which are less transparent.
For example, Cisco, Dell, and Hewlett-Packard have established private exchanges with their suppliers
and business partners (see Zhu, 2004). On the other hand, the market for electricity derivatives, which
lacks any transparency, has suffered from the collapse of Enron, a major innovator and trader of
electricity derivatives. It may be argued that many of the current problems with electricity derivatives
result from problems in the underlying market for electricity itself, which is also quite opaque.
7Benn Steil, an analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations, has argued in an interview with the
Economist that NYSE specialists’ enviable profitability is linked largely to their knowledge of order flow
(see The Economist, May 5th 2001).
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future expected profits.8 More importantly, in equilibrium, dealers try to attract
order flow in both directions, i.e., they try to be competitive in both sides of the
market and to do so they jointly set their ask and bid.9 This result departs from most
of the theoretical results in the literature on dealer markets where dealers set their
asks and bids independently. Nevertheless, our result is consistent with the findings
in the experimental works by Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999, 2000) on how dealers
behave in opaque and in transparent markets.
This paper provides a series of testable predictions on the impact of transparency
on price dynamics. Note that the explicit computation of the equilibrium pricing
strategies allows us to examine the impact of market opaqueness on metrics of
market quality such as spreads, volatility and price efficiency. Some of the results we
obtain are similar to those delivered by Madhavan (1995) or Bloomfield and O’Hara
(2000), among others. Nevertheless, we also offer new predictions that might be
useful to econometricians with price data. Among the similar results we also find that
post trade opaqueness has the following effects. (1) It results in a reversal in the
normal intraday pattern of the bid ask spread. (2) It increases price volatility because
the differences between the dealers who transact in the two periods are bigger in the
opaque market and this is reflected in prices. (3) It reduces transaction price
efficiency because less information is impounded in prices. The main new predictions
we offer may help to reconcile the theoretical results on trade disclosure with the
empirical evidence from opaque markets such as the FX market or the corporate
junk bond markets. In particular, (1) We show that transaction prices in an opaque
market do not follow a martingale, and consequently, the first order differences in
prices may not be uncorrelated. This topic is of relevance since until now in all the
information based models this property was satisfied.10 (2) In the opaque market,
spreads increase over time even if there was no order in the past.11 Similarly, we
show that if dealers have asymmetric beliefs about the value of the security, then
spreads are history dependent. (3) Finally, we show that prices in opaque markets
are more spread out. In particular we show that in equilibrium there is price
dispersion in the opaque market whereas this is not the case if trades are reported.12
8The fact that market makers experiment with prices is not new. For instance, Leach and Madhavan(1992, 1993) deliver price experimentation when trading is accomplished through a single market maker
(i.e., a specialist). By contrast, in the present paper we show that this phenomenon can occur in a market
with a competitive group of market makers if the market is opaque.
9This result may seem to be in conflict with the empirical evidence reported in Hansch et al. (1998) which
suggests that a majority of dealers try to attract order flow primarily in one direction. Note that their
empirical findings are consistent with the inventory model of dealership markets. Since in our model
dealers are risk neutral, there is no contradiction between their empirical findings and our results.
10Note that in many of these models post-trade transparency is either explicitly or implicitly assumed.
We find here that this serial uncorrelation property depends on the degree of post-trade transparency of
the market.
11Peng (2001) provides evidence that the bid-ask spreads increase over time when no orders arrive. This
empirical finding is supportive of this prediction.
12Empirical research on the corporate junk bond market (an opaque market) shows evidence of price
dispersion across dealers. See, for instance, Saunders et al. (2002) where this finding is present for a sample
of bond trades conducted by a major asset manager/dealer in the OTC corporate bond market.
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Our study builds on a large body of research investigating how transparency
affects market behavior. A part of this literature has analyzed how transparency
before the trade, pre trade transparency, affects market behavior. Some of these
studies have focused on issues related to visibility of market orders. So, Madhavan
(1996) shows that disclosing information about the composition of order flows can
increase price volatility and lower market liquidity. Pagano and Ro¨ell (1996) find
that trading costs for uninformed traders are generally lower in more transparent
markets. Some other studies have focused on the visibility of market quotes. In
particular, Biais (1993) and Frutos and Manzano (2002) compare centralized and
fragmented markets and show that the ability to observe price setters’ quotes affects
spreads and the welfare of market participants.
Another part of this literature has focused on the delayed reporting of trades. In
particular, Madhavan (1995) shows that delayed publication benefits large traders
who place multiple trades. Gemmill (1996) analyzes the effects of changing trade
reporting requirements on the London Stock Exchange. He concludes that
disclosure does not have a relevant effect on liquidity trading. By contrast, Porter
and Weaver (1998) show that dealers in the NASDAQ systematically delay trade
reporting, which suggests that it is beneficial to them. Recently, experimental studies
have been used to test theories concerning market structure. Naik et al. (1999) find
that the full and prompt disclosure of first stage trade details may reduce the welfare
of the public investor. The closest paper to ours is Roe¨ll (1991) which is also based
on Glosten and Milgrom. Ro¨ell studies trade reporting by comparing a transparent
and an opaque market in a two stage dynamic game. The main differences between
the two papers are to be found in the models’ specification and in the equilibria
implications. In Ro¨ell, the size of the order flow may convey information. This
assumption is crucial, as the active market maker will learn perfectly the identity of
the investor via his order size. Therefore, in her set up, an active market maker
knows whether an informed trader has traded, and whether he bought or sold. By
contrast, in our model only unitary orders are considered, which implies that a
market maker never knows the identity of the investor she has traded with. Ro¨ell’s
paper and ours also differ in the tie breaking rule employed whenever dealers set
identical prices (identical asks and bids). Here ties are broken by flipping a coin so
that a dealer might get to attend a sell but not a buy. In contrast, in Ro¨ell’s work,
nature picks a dealer and she will attend both sides of the market in the event of a tie.
Due to this difference, Ro¨ell provides a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies for
the opaque market, whereas no symmetric equilibrium exists for the opaque market
under our tie breaking rule. With respect to their implications, the two papers differ
from each other as well. The main contribution of our paper, not only from a
theoretical perspective but also from an empirical viewpoint, is the finding that price
dispersion is an equilibrium phenomenon. The empirical research on opaque
markets (recall footnote 12) has shown evidence of price dispersion across dealers.
This finding is not compatible with an equilibrium price schedule involving
symmetric pure strategies in the first period like the one proposed by Ro¨ell.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section we present a sequential trade
model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium in the transparent market. Section 4
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derives dealers’ pricing strategies in an opaque market. Section 5 compares some
market indicators corresponding to both market structures. Section 6 discusses the
robustness of the results. Concluding comments are presented in Section 7. Proofs
are included in the Appendix.2. The model
In this section we describe the basic structure of our sequential trade model, which
is similar to Glosten and Milgrom (1985) or Easley and O’Hara (1987). We consider
an economy with a single risky asset, whose liquidation value is denoted by v: The
risky asset can take on two possible values, 0 and 2, both equally likely. Potential
buyers and potential sellers trade the risky security with market makers or dealers,
who are responsible for supplying liquidity by simultaneously setting prices at which
they will buy and sell the asset. We will assume that there are only two dealers, dealer
D and dealer D0; who are both risk neutral.
Liquidity is demanded by two possible types of investors: informed traders and
uninformed traders.13 Informed traders know the liquidation value of the risky asset
perfectly. If an informed trader observes the high liquidation value, then she will buy
the stock if the smallest ask price is below 2; if she has observed the low liquidation
value, then she will sell it if the highest bid price is above 0: Uninformed traders do
not know the liquidation value and they are hence equally likely to be potential
buyers or potential sellers. They differ in their trading motivations. These may reflect
their liquidity needs, their price sensitivity, or individual specific trading rules. These
factors influence the willingness of an uninformed trader to transact. We will here
assume that with probability 1 p they decide not to trade.14
Trades occur throughout the trading day. We divide the day into two intervals of
time, t 0 and t 1: At each time interval, first market makers select ask and bid
prices at which they are willing to sell or to buy one unit of the asset. Then, a trader
is selected according to a probabilistic arrival process described below, and she
decides her order size; i.e., whether to buy one unit at the smallest ask price
(qt þ1Þ; to sell one unit at the highest bid price (qt 1Þ; or not to trade at all
(qt 0Þ:
The probabilistic structure of a trading day is depicted in the tree diagram in
Fig. 1. The first node of the tree corresponds to nature selecting whether information
will be good or bad. This node is only reached at the beginning of the trading day,
meaning that new information occurs only between trading days. In the second node,
an investor is selected. With half probability she is an informed trader, and with the
complementary probability she is an uninformed trader. The third node corresponds
13It is well known that in order to avoid a no-trade equilibrium, at least some traders must transact for
non-speculative reasons such as liquidity needs (see Milgrom and Stokey, 1982).
14Easley and O’Hara (1992) propose a similar specification. Leach and Madhavan (1993) likewise allowthe possibility of no trade by an uninformed investor but in their model the probability with which no
trade occurs is determined endogenously, whereas here it is assumed to be an exogenous variable.
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to the trading decision each trader will make if given the opportunity to trade.
Whether an informed trader buys or sells depends upon the relationship between the
Bad NewsGood News
Informed Uninformed Informed Uninformed
She trades
depending on her
information and
prices
1/2 1/2
Potential
buyer
Potential
seller
She trades
depending on
her information
and prices
Potential
buyer
Potential
seller
Buy No
trade
Sale No
trade
No
trade
Sale No
trade
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2 1/2
p 1-p p 1-p
p 1-p p 1-p
Buy
1/2
Fig. 1. The probabilistic structure of trade. At the beginning of the trading day, nature chooses the type of
information. Then, in the second node, an investor (informed or uninformed) is selected. The third node
corresponds to the trading decision each trader will make if he has an opportunity to trade. Finally, p is the
probability that an uninformed trader in the market will choose to trade.value of the risky asset she has observed and the prices. An uninformed trader is
equally likely to be a potential buyer or a potential seller. Moreover, she will trade
with probability p; with 14p40; and will not trade with the remaining probability
1 p: Note that when p approaches zero, an order to trade can only come from an
informed trader. When p approaches one, uninformed traders always choose to
trade. Throughout the paper we further assume that p 1=2 which facilitates
exposition; however, as we go along, we will explain how the results extend easily to
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any p 2 ½0; 1: At the end of this second interval of time the liquidation value of the
risky asset is made public and agents consume.
Since the problem we are addressing involves a multi dealer dynamic pricing game
of incomplete information, the equilibrium concept we use is that of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. We search for dealers’ pricing strategies with the typical property found
in rational expectations models of incorporating the information the trade itself
reveals.
Finally, the liquidity value of the risky asset and the investor’s arrival process are
assumed independent random variables. The joint distribution of all these random
variables will be common knowledge.3. The post-trade transparent market
In a transparent market, at the end of the first round, all the trading information
related to t 0 is publicly disclosed. Both dealers will hold the same information and
will hence quote the same bid and ask prices. Further, competition combined with
risk neutrality dictates that any rents earned on trades would be bid away.
Consequently, prices will equal reservation quotes so that the expected profit on any
trade will be zero. The result is due to the price competition among symmetric risk
neutral dealers.
When computing the optimal pricing strategies, we consider that the informed
trader’s strategy is to sell when v 0 and to buy if v 2: We will then show the
optimality of this behavior. The following proposition explicitly characterizes the
Bayes Nash equilibrium in a market with post trade transparency.15
Proposition 1. There exists a unique Bayes Nash equilibrium in the post trade
transparent market, where the equilibrium price quotation function at t 0; P0ðq0Þ
satisfies
P0ðq0Þ Eðvjq0Þ 1þ
2
3
q0,
and the equilibrium price quotation function at t 1; P1 ðq1; q0Þ satisfies
P1ðq1; q0Þ Eðvjðq0; q1ÞÞ
1þ 12
13
q1 if q1 q0a0;
1 if q1aq0a0;
1þ 2
3
q1 if q0 0:
8><
>:
The logic behind these expressions is clear. Consider, for instance, a potential
sequence of buy orders. Dealers know that this potential sequence of trades could be
generated by (1) the independent arrival of informed traders in periods 0 and 1, (2)
the arrival of an informed trader in period 0 followed by a liquidity trader in period
1, (3) the arrival of a liquidity trader in period 0 followed by an informed trader in
15The derivation of the equilibrium in our transparent market is similar to that of Roe¨ll (1991) and
Madhavan (1995). However, the equilibria are not identical because of the different models we consider.
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period 1, or (4) the independent arrival of liquidity traders in both periods. In cases
(1) (3) above, there is an investor who is informed, and her order reveals that the
value of the risky asset is the high one, whereas in case (4) the potential sequence of
trades is not informative about the liquidation value. Since 1=13 is the conditional
probability of case (4) given the potential sequence of trades, it follows that Eðvjq0
1; q1 1Þ 25=13: Now, Bertrand competition combined with risk neutrality
implies that P1ð1; 1Þ 25=13: The expressions for the other prices are obtained
similarly.
When the first round ends without any trading activity, dealers do not revise their
quotes as they do not observe any new relevant information about v. Otherwise,
following a trade, they set new prices since the type of trade has signal value about v:
In particular, when there is trade continuation, a sell (buy) in the first period
decreases (increases) the bid (ask) price in the second period. By contrast, when there
is trade reversal, dealers set their ask and their bid in the second period equal to the
ex ante expected value of the security. In either case, bids and asks are not symmetric
around previous transaction prices. Note that the midquote following a sell (buy) is
higher (lower) than the previous transaction prices.
Finally, equilibrium prices lie in the interval ð0; 2Þ: This ensures that the informed
trader’s strategy to sell (buy) the asset if she has observed the low (high) value is
optimal in both periods.4. The post-trade opaque marketIn an opaque market, the trading information related to t 0 is not made public,
which prevents free riding from non trading dealers. A dealer may hence now choose
to invest in producing information by pricing more aggressively in the first round so
as to use his private knowledge from trade to extract rents in the second round. By
doing so, dealers depart from maximizing expected profits in each period to
maximize the sum of their profits.16
An important feature of our modeling strategy is that the amount of information
dealers can acquire in the opaque market depends on whether they choose to be
competitive in both sides of the market or just in one side. A dealer who is
competitive in both sides of the market is perfectly informed about the occurrence
and sign of the order at the first round. A dealer who is competitive in one side
becomes perfectly informed if he attended the order.17 Otherwise, he is unable to
distinguish between the event of no order arrival and the event in which the order
was attended by his competitor. We will say that a dealer specializes if he chooses to
16Any equilibrium strategy in the opaque market must yield zero overall expected profits as there is price
competition between risk-neutral dealers who are ex-ante identical. However, contrary to the transparent
market, equilibrium strategies do not necessarily yield zero expected profits in each period.
17Throughout this section when we write ‘‘informed’’ or ‘‘uninformed’’ referring to a dealer, we are
specifying his knowledge, or lack of it, about the order type in the first round, and not the knowledge
about the liquidation value of the security.
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be competitive only in one side of the market. We will say that a dealer invests in
perfect learning if he chooses to be competitive in both sides of the market.
In order to obtain the optimal pricing strategies we solve the model by backward
induction under the provison that an informed trader sells when v 0 and buys if
v 2: That is, given the information sets the dealers bring into the second round, we
solve for the dealers’ optimal pricing strategies at t 1: Given these optimal
strategies at t 1; we then solve for the optimal strategies at t 0:
4.1. Optimal quotes at t 1
In the second period there are two relevant continuation paths to consider
depending on dealers’ decision to be competitive in both sides of the market or just in
one side:(1) The continuation path that follows dealers’ specialization at t 0; i.e., a dealer
setting the best ask and his competitor setting the best bid.
(2) The continuation path that follows investment in perfect learning at t 0; i.e., a
dealer setting both the best ask and the best bid.18The key difference between these two paths is the amount of informational
asymmetry among dealers. In the second path, we have the competition between a
dealer with complete information and a dealer completely ignorant about the order
type of the first period. By contrast, in the first path, a non trading dealer knows at
least that the order was not the one for which he was competitive. Thus, in the
second path one dealer follows his priors and the other revises his beliefs, whereas in
the first one both dealers revise their beliefs but each one incorporates different
information.19
At the second period of trade, dealers are not concerned about the learning effect
of their actions, as there is no other period at which they may profit from the
acquired information. It is hence optimal for them to treat each side of the market
(buys and sells) independently. This independence and the symmetry of the model
allows us to concentrate, without loss of generality, on buy orders so that we will
here only develop the ask price.
4.1.1. Specialization
Specialization gives rise to a game of incomplete information in which each dealer
may have two types; i.e., there are four potential players. If dealer D specialized in
buy orders and dealer D0 in sell orders, then these potential players are dealer D who
observed a buy order, dealer D who did not trade and hence does not know whether
18The continuation path that follows after dealers set equal prices in the first period can be analyzed by
using the results for specialization and/or perfect learning. We will further elaborate on this point as we
discuss these paths in more detail.
19The information set of a dealer at t ¼ 1 reflects all the values of q0 to which he assigns positive
probability of their having happened.
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q0 0 or q0 1; dealer D
0 who observed a sell order and, finally, dealer D0 who did
not trade and hence does not know whether q0 0 or q0 1: We will refer to them
as Dð1Þ; Dð0; 1Þ; D0ð 1Þ and D0ð1; 0Þ; respectively. Note that the two types of each
dealer correspond to the two possible information sets each dealer may have at t 1
when there is specialization. Furthermore, the realization of q0 will determine which
types are actually present at t 1:
To analyze specialization, we start by deriving the reservation ask prices.
Lemma 2. If at t 0 dealer D set the best ask and dealer D0 set the best bid, then the
reservation selling quotes at t 1 are the following:
A
Dð1Þ
r;1
25
13
; AD
0ð1;0Þ
r;1 1þ 23 Zþ 1213 ð1 ZÞ; A
Dð0;1Þ
r;1 1þ 23 y and
A
D0ð1Þ
r;1 1,
where
y Prðq0 0; q1 1jq0 2 f0; 1g; q1 1Þ
6
11
and
Z Prðq0 0; q1 1jq0 2 f0; 1g; q1 1Þ
6
19
.
In the opaque market reservation quotes differ across dealers. Those with
pessimistic information about the value of the security can use this information to
undercut the price of their competitors in order to make extra profits. This
undercutting generates a situation similar to the Edgeworth cycle that results in the
non existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.20
Proposition 3. Under specialization there is no equilibrium continuation in which
dealers use pure price strategies.
Nevertheless there exists an equilibrium in which dealers randomize as shown in
the next proposition.
Proposition 4. If at t 0 dealer D set the best ask and dealer D0 set the best bid, then
the ask quotation at t 1 is set according to the following mixed strategies
equilibrium:
Dð1Þ who knows that the past order was a buy sets his reservation selling price, 25
13
:
D0ð 1Þ who knows that the past order was a sell randomizes in the interval ½S; Z
20Dð1Þ will set an ask price equal to his reservation ask price, 25=13: If dealer D0ð1; 0Þ were to match this
0price, then the best response by Dð0; 1Þ is to slightly undercut this price. Given this strategy, D ð1; 0Þ finds
it profitable to undercut so as to win no matter his opponent’s type. This undercutting fosters a newundercutting by Dð0; 1Þ; and prices will reach AD0 ð1;0Þr;1 : At this point, dealer D0ð1; 0Þ is better off raising his
price back to 25/13 and price undercutting begins anew. Dealers’ best replies generate a cycle with no end.
The intuition is similar to that in Dennert (1993) where no equilibrium in pure price strategies exists. There
is a discontinuity of the payoffs such that even a slight change of prices produces a discontinuous shift in
the expected market maker’s clientele.
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according to the cumulative distribution function
F D0ð1ÞðAÞ
11
5
A S
A 1
 
.D0ð1; 0Þ with information set f1; 0g plays a mixed strategy with support ½Z; 25
13
: He
assigns probability according to the distribution FD0ð1;0Þ which has a mass point at
25=13; where
F D0ð1;0ÞðAÞ
3ðA ZÞ
3A 5
.
25Dð0; 1Þ with information set f0; 1g randomizes in the interval ½S;
13
Þ according to
the cumulative distribution function FDð0;1Þ which has a kink at Z: Furthermore,
F Dð0;1ÞðAÞ
A S
A 1
if SpApZ;
19A 35
6A 10
if ZpAo 25
13
:
8><
>:
Finally, the values of S and Z are S 6Zþ5
11
and Z 335
179
:The properties of the mixed strategies equilibrium deserve some comments. In this
equilibrium a dealer informed about a previous purchase never wins, and he sets an
ask price equal to his reservation ask price. The two possible types of dealer D0
randomize over linked pairs of prices.21 In particular, D0ð 1Þ randomizes in the
interval ½S; Z; whereas D0ð1; 0Þ randomizes in ½Z; 25
13
Þ: Dealer D0ð1; 0Þ gets zero
expected profit as he may share the market with dealer Dð1Þ: Both types of dealer D0
may have Dð0; 1Þ as their opponent. Because of this, Dð0; 1Þ randomizes over the
union of the asks set by his two potential opponents, i.e., over the interval ½S; 25
13
Þ:
Furthermore, he derives a positive expected profit from any of the ask prices he sets.
The equilibrium strategies can be depicted by means of a box, shown in Fig. 2. In the
x axis we arrange dealers depending on their willingness to transact. In the y axis, we
plot prices. In this box, when analyzing the ask side, we consider the southwest
corner as the origin. In contrast, we use the northwest corner as the origin when we
study the bid side.
Both dealers’ expected profits at t 1 coincide. We can hence focus, without loss
of generality, on dealer D: First note that he can only benefit from his private
information in case of reversal. If q0 1; then he only makes profits if a sell order
comes. Consequently, his expected profits are 5
24
ðS 1Þ; where 5
24
is the probability
of reversal from a buy to a sell. If q0a1; then he will only profit if q1 1: The
expected profits he will make equal 11
40
ðS 15
11
Þ; where 11
40
is the probability that
21Randomization over linked pair of prices is also found in the dynamic auction analyzed by Frutos and
Rosenthal (1998).12
Dð0; 1Þ assigns to a future buy. Adding up, using Bayes’ rule, the overall expected
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Fig. 2. Range of prices in the mixed strategies equilibrium under specialization. This figure shows the
range of prices in the mixed strategy equilibrium assuming that, at t ¼ 0; dealer D specialized on buy
orders and dealer D0 on sell orders. In this continuation path there are four potential players: Dð1Þ;
D0ð1; 0Þ; Dð0; 1Þ and D0ð 1Þ: Dð1Þ represents dealer D who observed a buy order, Dð0; 1Þ denotes dealer
D who does not know whether q0 ¼ 0 or 1: The types of dealer D0 are analogously defined. In the x-axis
we arrange dealers depending on their willingness to transact. In the y-axis, we plot prices.profits from trading at t 1 are
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ð4S 5Þ
31 504
:
4.1.2. Investment in perfect learning
When a dealer is competitive in both sides of the market, at the end of the period
he can perfectly infer the order size. Note that if he did not trade in the first period,
then he correctly infers that q0 0: Thus, under perfect learning by dealer D the
potential players (or types of players) at t 1 are: dealer D who observed a buy
order, dealer D who knows that q0 0; dealer D who observed a sell order, and
dealer D0 who is completely uninformed. We will refer to them as Dð1Þ; Dð0Þ; Dð 1Þ
and U, respectively. The following lemma derives their reservation selling prices.
Lemma 5. If at t 0 dealer D was competitive in both sides of the market, then the
reservation selling prices at t 1 are the following:
A
Dð1Þ
r;1
25
13
; ADð1Þr;1 1 and A
Dð0Þ
r;1 A
U
r;1
5
3
.
As in the previous path, dealers’ information determines their willingness to sell.
Obviously, the informed dealer has the same reservation quotes as if he were in a
13
transparent market, whereas the uninformed dealer holds the same reservation
quotes in both periods. If there were trading activity at t 0; then the informed
dealer has a double advantage over his competitor. On the one hand, he has a more
accurate estimate of the liquidation value of the risky asset. On the other hand, he
knows precisely what information his competitor possesses. This double advantage
will have an impact not only on profits but also on the pricing strategies of both
dealers.
Price competition among asymmetrically informed dealers results in the non
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.22 The mixed strategies equilibrium is given
in the next proposition.
Proposition 6. Under perfect learning, the equilibrium ask quotation at t 1 is set
according to the following mixed strategies:Dð1Þ who knows that there was a buy order sets his reservation selling price, 25
13
:
Dð0Þ who knows that there was no trade randomizes by setting prices in the interval
½3519 ; 2513Þ: He assigns probability according to the distribution GDð0Þ; where
GDð0ÞðAÞ
19A 35
6A 10
.
Dð 1Þ who knows that there was a sell order randomizes in the interval ½5
3
; 35
19
: Heassigns probability according to the distribution GDð1Þ; where
GDð1ÞðAÞ
8
5
3A 5
A 1
 
.
Finally, the uninformed dealer randomizes in the interval ½5
3
; 25
13
 according to the
cumulative distribution function G ; which has a mass point at 25 ; whereU 13
GU ðAÞ
3A 5
3ðA 1Þ if
5
3
pAp 35
19
;
36A 65
12ð3A 5Þ if
35
19
pAo 25
13
:
8>><
>>:
22In equilibrium, the dealer with the smallest reservation ask, Dð 1Þ; will always undercut the price set
by his competitor. The uninformed dealer accounts for this fact, and hence he optimally sets a price equalto the reservation ask of dealer Dð1; 0Þ: This behavior makes both Dð 1Þ and Dð0Þ slightly undercut the
price set by dealer U. But then, the uninformed dealer only wins when meeting dealer Dð1Þ: He accounts
for this fact, and hence he optimally increases his price up to the reservation ask of dealer Dð1Þ; making
both Dð 1Þ and Dð0Þ further increase the quotes they offer, setting an ask slightly below the ask set by
dealer U. But then the uninformed dealer can decrease his quote, beating any of his opponents while
making profits. As the uninformed resets the price, the informed immediately follows and price
undercutting begins anew. This will activate behavior leading to a cycle with no end, which results in the
non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
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Fig. 3. Range of prices in the mixed strategies equilibrium under perfect learning. This figure shows the
range of prices in the mixed strategy equilibrium assuming that, at t ¼ 0; dealer D was competitive in both
sides of the market. The potential players in this continuation path are: Dð1Þ; Dð0Þ; Dð 1Þ and U. DðjÞ
represents dealer D who observed q0 ¼ j and U denotes dealer D0 who is completely uninformed about the
order type in the first round. In the x-axis of this box we arrange dealers depending on their willingness to
transact (note that Dð0Þ and U have the same willingness to transact, we here plot them separately to
facilitate the comprehension of this figure). In the y-axis, we plot prices.intervals of prices. Type Dð 1Þ randomizes over the interval ½5
3
; 35
19
; type Dð0Þ
randomizes over ½35
19
; 35
13
Þ and the type with the most positive information about the
true value, Dð1Þ; sets his reservation selling price, 25
13
: The uninformed dealer
randomizes in the convex hull of the interval of prices used by the potential types of
his competitor, i.e., in the interval ½53 ; 2513: He makes zero expected profits with any of
the pure strategies he uses.
The equilibrium strategies of this continuation path are shown in the Fig. 3.
As in the previous continuation path, the informed dealer only expects positive
profits in case of reversals. So, dealer Dð 1Þ only expects positive profits if there is a
buy order in which case he makes profits of 2
3
: Consequently, his expected profits are
5
24
 2
3
; where 5=24 is the probability of a reversal from a sell to a buy. By symmetry,
these are also the expected profits of dealer Dð1Þ: Finally, dealer Dð0Þ is indifferent
between q1 1 and q1 1 since his expected profits in the two possible events are
equal. In either case, he plays a mixed strategy with support ½35
19
; 25
13
Þ; which yields
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expected profits of 5=48: Direct computations yield expected profits from trading at
t 1 for the informed dealer equal to 25=192:4.2. Optimal quotes at t 0
Given the optimal responses corresponding to t 1; we now calculate the Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in the opaque market. It is important to point out that
opaqueness in the first round may generate equilibrium prices that depart from the
independence property. In most microstructure models [see, for instance, Glosten
and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1987), Dennert (1993), and Leach and
Madhavan (1993)], each market maker faces two independent bidding problems: one
for the ask and other for the bid side of the market. In our model, at t 0; each
dealer realizes that when setting his ask price, he needs to consider the relative
position of his bid with respect to his competitor’s bid, to deduce his expected profits,
and vice versa.
Using the equilibrium continuation derived before, the overall expected profits
accruing to dealer D if he sets prices 1þ aD0 and 1 bD0 while his competitor sets
prices 1þ aD00 and 1 bD
0
0 ; are as follows: If he is competitive in both sides of the market (aDoaD0 and bDobD0 Þ;23 then0 0 0 0
E½PD 1
8
ð3aD0 þ 3bD0 7124Þ;
 If he is only competitive in the ask side (aD0oaD00 and bD04bD00 Þ; then
E½PD 1
16
ð6aD0 þ 4S 9Þ;
 If he is only competitive in the bid side (aD04aD00 and bD0obD00 Þ; then
D 1 DE½P 
16
ð6b0 þ 4S 9Þ;
 If he is not competitive in any side of the market (aD04aD00 and bD04bD00 Þ; then
E½PD 0:To better understand the expected profits above, consider first the case in which a
dealer is competitive in both sides of the market and, further, chooses the same
selling and buying fees. Let DTS0 be the fee that makes null the expected profits
attending both sells and buys. Similarly, consider the case in which a dealer is
competitive in just one side of the market. Let DOS0 denote the fee that makes null the
expected profits attending either a buy or a sell. Using this notation we can rewrite
23It is easy to see that perfect learning dominates any continuation path in which there are equal prices
either in one side of the market or in both sides. We will hence consider here that dealers set different
prices. This restriction is satisfied in equilibrium as we will later show.16
dealer D’s expected profits as follows:0
continuation occurs, whereas the
a reversal. Note that they play a
market there is no continuation
equilibrium in pure strategies at
equal prices at t ¼ 0:Event Expected profitsaD0oaD
0
0 and b
D
0obD
0
03
8
ðaD0 þ bD0 2DTS0 ÞaD0oaD
0
0 and b
D
04b
D0
03
8
ðaD0 DOS0 ÞaD04a
D0
0 and b
D
0obD
0
0
03
8
ðbD0 DOS0 ÞaD04a
D0
0 and b
D
04b
D
00Notice that for any given pair of prices set by dealer D0; dealer D prefers to attend
both sides of the market instead of specializing on the bid side if and only if
aD0X2D
TS
0 D
OS
0 : Similarly, he prefers to attend both sides instead of specializing on
the ask side if and only if bD0X2D
TS
0 D
OS
0 : The next proposition shows that in an
opaque market one dealer (let us say, without loss of generality, dealer DÞ will be
competitive in both sides of the market and will hence gain perfect information
about the order flow. Consequently, in equilibrium there will be investment in perfect
learning. The next proposition summarizes the strategic behavior of dealers in an
opaque market.
Proposition 7. The following set of strategies constitutes a Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium for the opaque market:
At t 0 :
 Dealer D sets the following ask and bid: 1þ DTS0 and 1 DTS0 ; and Dealer D randomizes by setting prices ðA; BÞ such that
fðB; AÞ 2 ½1 DOS; 1 DTS  ½1þ DTS; 1þ DOS : A B DOS þ DTSg, (1)0 0 0 0 0 0
where DTS0
71
144
and DOS0
6101
11 814
:
He chooses among the prices that satisfy (1) according to a uniform cumulative
distribution function.
At t 1; dealers follow the equilibrium strategies described in Proposition 6.24
Note that, in equilibrium, for any price set by dealer D0 his opponent is better off
by attending both sides of the market as it is satisfied that aD0 D
TS
0 X2D
TS
0 D
OS
0 :
Our prediction is supported by laboratory experiments conducted by Bloomfield and
24It is important to point out that the proposed strategies in either Roe¨ll (1991) or Madhavan (1995) do
not constitute an equilibrium in our framework. In Madhavan both dealers set the same prices at t ¼ 0: At
t ¼ 1; the uninformed dealer quotes a price equal to the expected value of the security given that ainformed dealer (marginally) improves these quotes if and only if there is
pure strategies equilibrium while we have shown that in (our) opaque
equilibrium in pure strategies. In Ro¨ell, dealers play a symmetric
t ¼ 0: We have here shown that there is no equilibrium which involves
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O’Hara (1999, 2000). These authors call this behavior capturing early order flow.
Consequently, the second round of trade in the opaque market will be characterized
by the interplay between a perfectly informed dealer and a completely uninformed
dealer. The asymmetry between the dealers gives rise to an equilibrium in the second
round in mixed strategies and, consequently, to price dispersion.25 Moreover,
Proposition 7 shows that, in equilibrium, the uninformed dealer may attend the
order even in a reversal, contrary to results in Madhavan (1995) and Wu and Zhang
(2002).
The next corollary characterizes the corresponding equilibrium price quotation
functions.
Corollary 8. There exists a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the post trade opaque
market, where the equilibrium price quotation function at t 0; P0ðq0Þ; satisfies
P0ðq0Þ 1þ DTS0 q0
and the equilibrium price quotation at t 1; P1ðq1; q0Þ; is given by
P1ðq1; q0Þ 1þminfaDðq0q1Þ1 ; aU1 g  q1.
Both dealers make overall expected profits equal to zero. Nevertheless, the dealer
that chooses to be competitive in both sides of the market makes negative expected
profits in the initial period and positive expected profits in the final period. Just note
that
P0ðq0Þ 1þ DTS0 q0 1þ 23 q0 þ ðDTS0 23Þq0 E½vjq0 pq0,
where p40: Notice that p reflects the order flow payment that a dealer assumes in
order to gain monopoly power over information by capturing order flow that need
not be disclosed. Thus, in equilibrium, there is price experimentation in the post
trade opaque market.26
Price experimentation is also derived by other models of market making
such as Leach and Madhavan (1992, 1993). There price experimentation
occurs when trading is accomplished through a single market maker (i.e., a
specialist) who may experiment with prices to induce more informative order
flow. We show here that investment in producing information is also present in
markets with a competitive group of market makers if trade disclosure is not
mandatory.
25In the dealer market for corporate bonds (a low transparent market), Gehr and Martell (1992), using
lower-frequency corporate bond quote data, find that bid-ask spreads between dealers often do notintersect, a finding that is consistent with our equilibrium characterization.
26There are several mechanisms by which new information is incorporated into security prices. Among
them are price experimentation and price signaling. Note that both facilitate price discovery but they
operate very differently. In the former, dealers have the ability to expedite price discovery through binding
quotes. In the latter, dealers can use nonbinding price quotes to indicate to others information they hold.
Evidence of price signaling is found for the period before the opening of the Nasdaq market. There, dealers
enter non-binding quotes that can be considered as signals to indicate to others the equilibrium opening
prices conditional on the overnight information (see Cao et al., 2000).
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5. Comparison across market structures
This section is devoted to the comparison between the two market structures. To
this end, the superscript TðOÞ in a variable means that it corresponds to the post
trade transparent (opaque) market. We will first describe some characteristics of the
sequences of prices generated in the two markets to examine the main differences in
price dynamics between them. We will then study the implications of structure for
metrics of market quality such as spreads, volatility and price efficiency. Finally, we
study the impact of transparency on the welfare of market participants.5.1. Price dynamics
Equilibrium price quotations in the two market structures are given by
PT0 ðq0Þ 1þ 23 q0 and PT1 ðq1; q0Þ
1þ 1213 q1 for q1 q0a0;
1 for q1aq0a0;
1þ 2
3
q1 for q0 0;
8><
>:
PO0 ðq0Þ 1þ DTS0 q0 and PO1 ðq1; q0Þ 1þmin aDðq0q1Þ1 ; aU1
n o
 q1.
Prices in the first round are more attractive in the opaque market as the
competition between dealers to secure an informational advantage makes them set
higher bids and lower asks. The price difference between the two structures ðDTS0 23Þ
is negative and equal to 25
144
:
Consider now the prices at the second round of trade. If there is no trading activity
in the first period, then market makers only change their quotes in the opaque
market. In the transparent market, dealers do not observe new relevant information
and consequently, they do not revise their quotes.27 By contrast, in the opaque
market dealers set different prices across periods even when no transaction in the
first period occurs. Recall that the most competitive dealer sets prices at t 0 that
yield negative current expected profits. Consequently, if q0 0; then he must unwind
his position to avoid losses in period 1. This dynamic strategy results in smaller bids
and higher asks in the opaque market when there is no trade in the first round.
If there is trading activity at both rounds, prices in the second round are more
attractive for investors in the opaque market in the event of a continuation whereas
the opposite holds in reversals. In a continuation, a sequence of buys (sells) generates
an increasing (decreasing) sequence of prices in either market structure. In either
period, the opaque market provides a smaller ask and a larger bid (in expected
terms). In a reversal from a buy to a sell, the bid is smaller in the opaque market.
27Easley and O’Hara (1992) find that the spreads will decrease over time when no orders arrive in a post-
trade transparent market. Their result is due to the fact that the absence of trades may imply that no news
arrives, i.e., no informational event takes place, and therefore the likelihood of informed trading decreases.By contrast, in our model, it is assumed that there is always new information.
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Another important difference between the two market structures is that in the
opaque market quotes corresponding to the second round of trade are uncertain (as
dealers play mixed strategies) despite the fact that there is no new shock in the
fundamentals. Also note that under opaqueness the probability with which the two
dealers set the same quotes in either round is zero, whereas it is one in the
transparent market.5.1.1. Spreads
Consider now the impact of post trade opaqueness on spreads.
Corollary 9. The intraday patterns in bid ask spreads are opposite under both market
structures. While in the transparent mechanism spreads decrease from period 0 to
period 1, in the opaque market structure, they increase.
In the transparent market, at t 0 dealers are unwilling to improve competitive
prices because their competitors will free ride on the information they have gained
from observing the trading history. Furthermore, the expected bid ask spread
narrows over the day because the adverse selection faced by the market makers is
mitigated as they learn from order flow. In the opaque market, by contrast, a
completely different temporal pattern emerges. In the first period, the most
competitive dealer quotes a tight spread to acquire private information. This creates
a double winner’s curse problem in his competitor: i) with respect to the informed
investor, and ii) with respect to the informed dealer. This relatively severe adverse
selection problem widens his spreads and, by extension, the spreads of the informed
dealer who needs to cash in his investment in information acquisition.5.1.2. VolatilitySuppose now that trading activity has occurred at t 0: The possible absolute
price changes in the two structures are summarized in the next table:
Transparent Opaque ðexpected valuesÞ
Continuation 0:256 0:382
Reversal 0:667 1:235
Price volatility is due to differences between the prices set by the dealers who
accommodate the order in the two periods. In the transparent market, the only
difference between them is the information about v: By contrast, in the opaque
market there are strategic considerations that influence price quotations. To
understand this point, consider a continuation in buy orders. In the opaque market,
the dealers that will attend the buys are dealer D in the first period, and the
uninformed dealer D0 in the second one. Both dealers have the same information
about v. However, they differ in the strategies they follow (dynamic versus static)
and in the degree of uncertainty about the competitor’s type (while at t 0 there is
no such uncertainty, at t 1 dealer D0 who is uninformed does not know his
competitor’s type). The strategic differences in the opaque market have a larger
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impact than the informational differences in the transparent market resulting in a
larger price change in the opaque market.
Consider now a reversal from a buy to a sell. In the transparent market it induces a
large price change, in comparison to that of a continuation, as beliefs revert. In the
opaque market, this informational difference reinforces the strategic difference,
resulting in an absolute price change which exceeds that of a continuation.
Consequently, in either case, jPT1 PT0 jojEðPO1 Þ PO0 j holds. As the probabilities of
continuations and reversals are equal in both market structures, we obtain the
following result:
Corollary 10. Price volatility measured by the expected absolute change in price is
higher in the opaque market, i.e., ðEðjPT1 PT0 jÞÞoðEðjEðPO1 Þ PO0 jÞÞ:
5.1.3. Efficiency
In what follows we use the concepts of efficiency proposed by Roberts (1967). We
will say that prices are strong form efficient if they reflect all private information,
semi strong form efficient if they reflect all publicly available information, and weak
form efficient if they reflect the information in their own past values. Note that
whenever some traders have superior information, prices will not exhibit strong form
efficiency. This is the case in our setup. In the standard sequential trade model
proposed by Glosten and Milgrom (1985), the sequence of transaction prices follows
a martingale with respect to the sequence of trades. This property implies that prices
are semi strong form efficient in the sense that they reflect all the information
available to the market makers. Since these authors model a post trade transparent
market, it is not surprising that our transaction prices corresponding to the
transparent market hold the same property. However, in the post trade opaque
market, transaction prices are not a martingale with respect to past prices and so
they are not weak form efficient. To understand this result, notice that at t 0 when
setting an ask price, dealers bear in mind that this price corresponds to a purchase. In
the opaque market this is not made public, and consequently, prices at t 1 do not
necessarily incorporate this information. All these results are summarized in the
following corollary.
Corollary 11. In equilibrium, transaction prices are semi strong form efficient in the
transparent market and they are not weak form efficient in the opaque market.
5.2. Welfare
Now we turn our attention to the effect of transparency on the welfare of market
participants.
Corollary 12. (a) Investors who transact in the first period prefer the opaque market.
(b) If there is no trading activity in the first period, then investors who transact at
t 1 prefer the transparent market. Otherwise, those investors whose order type
coincides (differs) with the previous one are better (worse) off in the opaque market.
Moreover, in expected terms, investors who transact in the second period prefer the
transparent market.
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(c) As a group, informed traders are better off in the opaque market, whereas
liquidity traders prefer the transparent market.
This result tells us that the lack of transparency benefits investors who transact at
t 0 at the expense of traders who arrive later. The rationale is as follows.
Opaqueness increases competition among dealers to attract valuable order flow,
leading to better prices for all period 0 investors. On the other hand, concerning the
later period, in case of a continuation all period 1 investors prefer the opaque
market.28 An informed trader prefers the opaque market because it provides her
more camouflage. An uninformed trader prefers the opaque market because she will
transact with the uninformed dealer, whereas in the transparent market she will
transact with an informed dealer. By contrast, in case of no trading in the first round
or of a reversal any investor prefers the transparent market. Notice that, in this case,
opaqueness reduces price competition because the informed dealer can undercut his
competitor’s quote while still earning positive profits.
Our comparison between the two market structures generates some stylized facts that
can be contrasted with the experience in actual markets. We have shown that liquidity
traders prefer greater disclosure, whereas traders with private information prefer
opaque trading systems. These results are consistent with the evidence on after hours
trading where trade reporting transparency declines as most trades are not reported on
the day they occur.29 The analysis in Barclay and Hendershott (2004) on trading after
hours shows that trades may be more informed after hours (their data base shows that
the average price impact of a trade is higher after hours than during the trading day).
They suggest that uninformed traders have no incentive to move their trades outside of
the normal trading day. This evidence is consistent with our welfare comparison. In a
related paper, Barclay and Hendershott (2003) find that stock prices after hours are less
efficient than prices during the day. After the close there are large bid ask spreads, thin
trading, and little new information. The stylized facts generated by our model are in
accord with this evidence. Similarly, the empirical investigation of the Italian Treasury
bond primary and secondary markets, reported in Drudi and Massa (2005), shows that
informed dealers may refrain from trading in the more transparent market in order to
exploit their informational advantage in the less transparent one, or they may use the
more transparent market in order to manipulate prices.6. RobustnessThe model was based on a number of simplifying assumptions, and at this point
we are interested in assessing the impact of relaxing them in our conclusions. In this
section some alternative formulations are examined.
28This result is consistent with Madhavan (1995) who shows that large traders are better off in an
opaque market because this structure allows them to break their orders over time without attracting too
much attention of the market, and hence, reducing the corresponding price impact.
29On the NASDAQ, data on after-hours trading is integrated into the statistical record next day with a
24 hour cut-off.
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6.1. Uninformed investors trade
Throughout the paper we have assumed that the probability with which an
uninformed investor chooses to trade is p 1=2: We now provide the arguments that
show the robustness of our results to changes in p: We concentrate in the opaque
market as in the transparent market results are trivially robust to changes in p: To
examine this issue we first consider the two extreme cases (p ! 0 and 1).
As p approaches zero all ask prices (under either specialization or perfect learning)
converge to 2 with probability one . The intuition is clear: as p approaches zero, there
will be common knowledge that any buy order comes from an informed investor.
Consequently, in equilibrium, dealers perfectly anticipate that a buy order implies
v 2: In this extreme case, dealers will be indifferent between attending both sides or
only one side of the market. Furthermore, the two market structures are equivalent.
Consider now that p 1: Under specialization, the opaque market becomes
informationally equivalent to the transparent market. Note that if each dealer was
competitive in one side of the market, a dealer who did not trade can correctly infer
that the order type was the one for which he was not competitive. The equilibrium
strategies at t 1 will then converge to the equilibrium strategies in the transparent
market, which results in null expected profits in either period. Matters are very
different under perfect learning, where the uninformed dealer randomizes by setting
ask prices belonging to the interval ½32; 95; dealer Dð 1Þ randomizes in the interval ½32; 95Þ
and Dð1Þ sets an ask price equal to 9=5: Expected profits for the informed dealer are
hence strictly positive at t 1: Perfect learning is hence optimal. In equilibrium,
dealer D will set a selling (buying) price equal to 1þ 5=16 ð1 5=16Þ in the first
period, and dealer D0 will randomize uniformly by setting ðA; BÞ such that ðB; AÞ 2
½1 1=2; 1 5=16  ½1þ 5=16; 1þ 1=2 with A B 13=16: At the second stage
they will play the strategies described above. The equilibrium is hence qualitatively
identical to the one for p 1=2: Nevertheless, there will be more price dispersion
across dealers when p 1 than with p 1=2:
For intermediate values of p; results qualitatively similar to the ones derived here
are obtained.30 The rationale behind the robustness with respect to changes in p is as
follows. Expected profits under specialization are concave with a maximum at po1:
For small values of p; an increase in the probability of uninformed trade results in an
increase in expected profits since adverse selection decreases. In contrast, when p is
large enough and dealers specialize, their private information is more likely to be
inferred and they may hence not earn much in informational rents. In contrast,
under perfect learning expected profits are strictly increasing in p; and hence reach a
maximum at p 1: To understand this result notice that there are two opposite
effects. On the one hand, the signal they gain from the order type is less informative
as it is less likely that it will come from an informed investor. Consequently, their
informational rents decrease as their private information is less valuable. But, on the
other hand, an increase in p reduces the probability of no trading, and hence, the
30In the working paper version of this paper (Frutos and Manzano, 2003) the interested reader can find
the model explicitly solved for any p 2 ½0; 1:
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types Dð1Þ and Dð 1Þ; which are the types of dealers with a double informational
advantage with respect to their competitors, are more likely. The second effect
dominates making expected profits under perfect learning strictly increasing in p: The
preference for experimentation is hence robust to changes in p: Further, in
equilibrium, dealers cannot tie in the first period as this would give rise to profitable
deviations. Consequently, equilibrium price strategies must be like the ones
described in the paper for any positive p:
The comparison between the two market structures in terms of metrics of market
quality is also robust to changes in the specification of p: Furthermore, expected
spreads are decreasing in p in both market structures. The difference between
expected spreads (in absolute value) is also decreasing in p in the transparent market
structure. By contrast, in the opaque mechanism, it is increasing in p unless p is large
enough. The rationale is as follows. At larger values of p; expected spreads are
smaller as the adverse selection problem faced by market makers is mitigated when
the probability that an uninformed trader transacts increases. By the same token, an
increase in p leads to a less informative order flow, and therefore, market makers
have more similar information across periods of trade. In the transparent market,
this is all that counts when setting prices; consequently, the difference between
expected spreads must decrease with p: In the opaque market, by contrast, as p
increases the winner’s curse with respect to the informed investor likewise decreases
but the one with respect to the informed dealer increases. When p is small the second
effect dominates, whereas the opposite holds if p is large enough.
6.2. Information arrival
We have here assumed that information only arrives at the beginning of the
trading day. This assumption is crucial to the model because dealers know when to
experiment and when to profit from their information. In a more complex
framework with information arriving at random times, unbeknownst to the dealers,
it is natural to wonder if the results obtained here will still hold.
To examine the role of random information arrival, we now consider a variation
of our original model. More precisely, we now assume that at the beginning of the
trading day, nature has three moves in deciding first whether there will be new
information in the trading day, second if there is, in which period it is generated and
then, what information it will be. Let g denote the probability that new information
is generated during the trading day. In this case, let d0 represent the probability that
this information is generated at the beginning of the trading day (obviously, it is
generated in the second period with the complementary probability). Note that in
this model, all investors are uninformed with probability 1 g: With probability gd0
the two types of investors (informed and uninformed) can be present in the market at
either period. With probability gð1 d0Þ only uninformed investors can trade in the
first period, whereas in the second period any type of investor may trade.
The resolution of this extension shows that experimentation is a robust
phenomenon. Whenever gd0 is not zero there is an equilibrium in the opaque
market in which there is experimentation: one dealer finds it profitable to attend both
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sides of the market if there is a non null probability of exploiting the acquired
information in subsequent trading. In order to further clarify the impact of g and d0
on the equilibrium strategies we here now provide, without proof, the equilibrium
strategies in the opaque market for p 1:31
Proposition 13. When the market is opaque and gd0a0; the following set of strategies
constitutes a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
At t 0 : Dealer D sets the following ask and bid: 1þ d0gðð4þ gÞ=16Þ and 1 d0gðð4þ
gÞ=16Þ; and
0 Dealer D randomizes by setting prices ðA; BÞ such that
ðB; AÞ 2 1 gd0
2
; 1
d0gð4þ gÞ
16
	 

 1þ d0 gð4þ gÞ
16
; 1þ gd0
2
	 

: A B

d0g
12þ g
16
 
. ð2Þ
He chooses among the prices that satisfy (2) according to a uniform distribution
probability.
At t 1; dealers set the following equilibrium strategies:
4þgð3d0þ2Þ Dð1Þ sets his reservation selling price, gd0þ4 :h i Dð 1Þ randomizes in the interval 2þg
2
; 4þgð3d0þ2Þgd0þ4 : He assigns probability accordingto the distribution GDð1Þ; where
GDð1ÞðAÞ
4ð2A g 2Þ
Að4 gd0Þ þ 3gd0 2g 4
.
 The uninformed dealer, dealer D0; randomizes in the interval 2þg2 ; 4þgð3d0þ2Þgd0þ4
h i
according to the cumulative distribution function GU ; which has a mass point at
4þgð3d þ2Þ0
gd0þ4 ; where
GU ðAÞ
ð2A g 2Þð4 gd0Þ
2ðAð4 gd0Þ þ 3gd0 2g 4Þ
.
Note that when gd0 ! 1; the strategies above converge to the equilibrium
strategies described in the previous subsection. In particular, in the second period of
31The qualitative features of the equilibria in this extension are similar to the ones in the original model.
The equilibria can easily be obtained by applying the techniques developed here. Nevertheless both the
notation and the computations become more cumbersome as more parameters are now in place (g and d0Þ:
The authors can send the equilibria explicit computations upon request.
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trade the uninformed dealer randomizes by setting ask prices belonging to the
interval ½3
2
; 9
5
; dealer Dð 1Þ randomizes in the interval ½3
2
; 9
5
Þ and Dð1Þ sets an ask price
equal to 9=5: In the first period, dealer D will set a selling (buying) price equal to
1þ 5=16 (1 5=16Þ; and dealer D0 will randomize uniformly by setting ðA; BÞ such
that ðB; AÞ 2 ½1 1=2; 1 5=16  ½1þ 5=16; 1þ 1=2 with A B 13=16:
On the other hand, when gd0 ! 0; dealers do not experiment in the opaque market
structure. Notice that if g 0; in each period dealers set prices equal to the
unconditional expected value of the asset, i.e., 1, and if d0 0; dealers set prices
equal to the unconditional expected value in the first period and set prices equal to
expectation of the value conditional on the order flow in the second period.
The analysis of this extension stresses the importance (and robustness) of strategic
information acquisition. Dealers will take actions to elicit information if they can
profit from this information later on. This is also the logic behind the results in Leach
and Madhavan (1992). They show that dealers invest in the production of
information by setting prices to induce statistically more informative order flow.
Under certain conditions, they can recoup the cost of this investment by making
better pricing decisions in the future with more precise information. They derive
price experimentation in a model where order quantity is variable and there is a
monopolistic market maker. In contrast, we obtain a similar result in a Glosten and
Milgrom type model where the order size is fixed and trading is sequential.7. ConclusionsUsing a two stage model of trading in a dealer market, we have analyzed here the
effects of post trade transparency on the performance of two market structures that
differ in the amount of information that is publicly available at the end of the first
stage. The main distinctive characteristic of our model is that the lack of
transparency forces market makers to consider if they prefer to specialize on one
side of the market or to jointly determine their asks and bids to become competitive
in both sides of the market.
We can summarize our results as follows. In the opaque market dealers may be
able to offer better prices because they can profit in subsequent trading from the
private information they infer from the current trades. The upshot of this is that
investors that transact in the first period are better off in the opaque market, but this
comes at the expense of traders who transact in the second period. Moreover, it is
shown that if there is no trading activity in the first period, then market makers only
change their quotes in the opaque market. Additionally, we find that the lack of
transparency provokes several price distortions: it exacerbates price volatility, it
creates price dispersion, and it also reduces price efficiency.
Our analysis has a number of implications for regulatory policy. We find that
transparent markets are more informationally efficient. However, regulators must
not forget that the increase of informational efficiency may be purchased at the
expense of higher spreads because market makers have less incentive to pay to
capture the information that a trade with an informed trader will bring. As our
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analysis demonstrates, traders with private information prefer systems with less
transparency. However, investors with no particular information advantage prefer
greater transparency. Therefore, no single transparency regime will be seen as
optimal by everybody. Additionally, the lack of post trade transparency can induce
fragmentation as traders seek off market venues for their trades. A major feature of
securities markets in recent years has been the development of new trading systems
and the sharp increase in competition. The arrival of competing trading venues with
different transparency arrangements poses the question of the extent to which these
trading venues respond to the current regulation requirements imposed on
exchanges.32Appendix A
Since throughout the paper we must determine how the market makers’ beliefs
evolve over the trading day, we first state the probabilities of the events v 2 and
v 0 conditional on a sequence of trades. Using Bayes’ rule, it follows that
Prðv 2jðq0; q1ÞÞ
1
2
þ 6
13
q0 if ðq0; q1Þ 2 fð1; 1Þ; ð 1; 1Þg;
5
6
if ðq0; q1Þ 2 fð1; 0Þ; ð0; 1Þg;
1
6
if ðq0; q1Þ 2 fð 1; 0Þ; ð0; 1Þg;
1
2
otherwise:
8>><
>>>:
Finally, the conditional probability of the event v 0 is derived as follows:
Prðv 0jðq0; q1ÞÞ 1 Prðv 2jðq0; q1ÞÞ; for any ðq0; q1Þ.
Proof of Proposition 1. In the post trade transparent market, the transaction price
must equal the expected value of the asset conditional upon the trading history and
the incoming order. Hence, P1ðq1; q0Þ Eðvjðq0; q1ÞÞ: Using the previous conditional
probabilities of v, we obtain the desired expressions.
Similarly,
P0ð1Þ Eðvjq0 1Þ Prðq1 1jq0 1ÞEðvjq0 1; q1 1Þ
þ Prðq1 0jq0 1ÞEðvjq0 1; q1 0Þ
þ Prðq1 1jq0 1ÞEðvjq0 1; q1 1Þ. ð3Þ
Using Bayes’ rule and the equilibrium quotation functions at t 1; the expression
for P0ð1Þ is obtained. Similar computations provide the expression for P0ð 1Þ: &
Proof of Lemma 2. If at t 0 dealer D set the best ask and he executed the order,
then at t 1 he has the same information as in the transparent market.
32In most jurisdictions, regulators have focused transparency requirements exclusively on exchanges. In
jurisdictions such as Switzerland, the UK and the US (as long as the trading volume is small) public
dissemination of exchange-traded securities that takes place on off-exchange market systems is notrequired. For more information on these issues see ‘‘Transparency and Market Fragmentation,’’ report
from the Technical Committee of the IOSC, November 2001.
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Consequently, applying Proposition 1, his reservation ask price is derived. If he did
not execute the order at t 0; he deduces that either q0 0 or q0 1: Therefore,
A
Dð0;1Þ
r;1 Eðvjq0 2 f0; 1g; q1 1Þ yEðvjq0 0; q1 1Þþð1 yÞEðvjq0 1; q1 1Þ;
where
y Prðq0 0; q1 1jq0 2 f0; 1g; q1 1Þ.
Using Bayes’ rule, we derive the value of y: Finally, using Proposition 1, the
expression for this reservation ask price is obtained. Consider now the reservation
quotes of the dealer D0 who set the best bid at t 0: If he executed the order, then
A
D0ð1Þ
r;1 1 follows trivially from Proposition 1. If he did not trade at t 0; he
deduces that either q0 0 or q0 1: Therefore, A
D0ð1;0Þ
r;1 Eðvjq0 2 f0; 1g; q1 1Þ
ZEðvjq0 0; q1 1Þ þ ð1 ZÞEðvjq0 1; q1 1Þ; where
Z Prðq0 0; q1 1jq0 2 f0; 1g; q1 1Þ.
Appealing to Proposition 1, the value of A
D0ð1;0Þ
r;1 stated in this lemma is derived. &
Proof of Proposition 4. If there was a sell order in t 0; then dealer D0ð 1Þ knows
that his opponent’s information set is f0; 1g: We claim that he randomizes in the
interval ½S; Z: By setting an ask price equal to S, he wins with probability one
achieving expected profits from trading PD
0ð1Þ
1 ðSÞ S 1: By playing Z; he wins
with probability 1 F Dð0;1ÞðZÞ and he loses with the complementary probability.
Consequently, PD
0ð1Þ
1 ðZÞ ð1 F Dð0;1ÞðZÞÞðZ 1Þ: Since in a mixed strategy
equilibrium expected profits from playing any selling price in the support must be
equal, PD
0ð1Þ
1 ðSÞ PD
0ð1Þ
1 ðZÞ yields
FDð0;1ÞðZÞ ZSZ1. (4)
Consider now dealer D with information set f0; 1g: This player did not trade in
the first round and, hence, he does not know the identity of his opponent. He believes
his opponent is D0ð1; 0Þ with probability 6=11: We claim that he randomizes in the
interval ½S; 2513Þ; where SoZo 2513 : By playing S, he wins with probability one, and his
expected profits from trading are given by
PDð0;1Þ1 ðSÞ S Eðvjq0 2 f0; 1g; q1 1Þ S 1511. (5)
By playing Z, with probability one he wins if his opponent is D0ð1; 0Þ; whereas with
probability one he loses if his opponent is D0ð 1Þ: Since in the first case he deduces
that q0 0; we have
PDð0;1Þ1 ðZÞ 611 ðZ Eðvjq0 0; q1 1ÞÞ 611 ðZ 53Þ. (6)
Finally, when setting A ! 25
13
; he wins with probability 1 FD0ð1;0Þð2513Þ if his opponent
is D0ð1; 0Þ; and he always loses if his opponent is D0ð 1Þ: Expected profits converge to
6
11
ð1 F D0ð1;0Þð2513ÞÞð2513 Eðvjq0 0; q1 1ÞÞ 611 ð1 F D0ð1;0Þð2513ÞÞ1039. (7)
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, ð5Þ ð6Þ and ð5Þ ð7Þ: Therefore,
S 15
11
6
11
ðZ 5
3
Þ, (8)
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and
S 15
11
6
11
ð1 F D0ð1;0Þð2513ÞÞ1039. (9)
Consider now that D0 did not trade in t 0: He believes his opponent is Dð0; 1Þ
with probability Z; where we recall that Z Prðq0 0; q1 1jq0 2 f0; 1g; q1 1Þ
6=19: We claim that he randomizes in the interval ½Z; 25
13
: By playing Z, he wins with
probability 1 FDð0;1ÞðZÞ if his opponent is Dð0; 1Þ and with probability one if his
opponent is Dð1Þ: The expected profits from playing this strategy are
Zð1 FDð0;1ÞðZÞÞðZ Eðvjq0 0; q1 1ÞÞ þ ð1 ZÞðZ Eðvjq0 1; q1 1ÞÞ.
Finally, when playing 2513 he loses with probability one if his opponent is Dð0; 1Þ and
he obtains zero expected profits if his opponent is Dð1Þ: Note that he wins but he
deduces that q0 1 and
25
13
Eðvjq0 1; q1 1Þ: Thus, PD
0ð1;0Þ
1 ð2513Þ 0: Equalizing
the expected profits from playing these two strategies, we get
6
19
ð1 F Dð0;1ÞðZÞÞðZ 53Þ þ 1319 ðZ 2513Þ 0. (10)
Using (4), Eqs. (8) and (10) define a system of two equations and two unknowns
whose solution is Z 335
179
and S 2905
1969
: Finally, by substituting the value of S into
(9), we obtain that FD0ð1;0Þð2513Þ 36179 :
Once the limits of the supports are derived, we can now proceed to compute the
distribution functions.
In order to get FD0ð1;0Þ we first compute the expected profits of dealer Dð0; 1Þ
when choosing A4Z; which are 6
11
ð1 F D0ð1;0ÞðAÞÞðA 53Þ: Differentiating with
respect to A and equating the derivative to zero, it follows that ðA 5
3
Þ f D0ð1;0ÞðAÞ
1 FD0ð1;0ÞðAÞ: This f.o.c. generates a differential equation whose boundary
condition is FD0ð1;0ÞðZÞ 0: The solution to the differential equation yields
FD0ð1;0ÞðAÞ 3ðA ZÞ=ð3A 5Þ:
Similarly, to obtain FD0ð1Þ we differentiate the expected profits of dealer Dð0; 1Þ
with respect to A: This allows us to obtain a differential equation with boundary
condition F D0ð1ÞðSÞ 0: The solution to the differential equation yields FD0ð1ÞðAÞ
11
5
ððA SÞ=ðA 1ÞÞ:
Finally, to derive F Dð0;1Þ we first study the problem faced by D0ð 1Þ: His expected
profits from setting any AoZ become ð1 FDð0;1ÞðAÞÞðA 1Þ: Differentiating with
respect to A; and using the boundary condition F Dð0;1ÞðSÞ 0; the c.d.f.
FDð0;1ÞðAÞ ðA SÞ=ðA 1Þ is derived. Regarding the final part of FDð0;1Þ; i.e.,
for A4Z; we consider the maximization problem faced by D0ð1; 0Þ: His expected
profits from trading will be
6
19
ð1 F Dð0;1ÞðAÞÞðA 53Þ þ 1319 ðA 2513Þ.
Differentiating with respect to A; using F Dð0;1ÞðZÞ 511 as boundary condition, we
derive F Dð0;1ÞðAÞ ð19A 35Þ=ð6A 10Þ; with FDð0;1Þð2513Þ 1 as claimed. &
Proof of Lemma 5. It is omitted since it is similar to the proof of Lemma 2. &
Proof of Proposition 6. We first note that the uninformed dealer makes zero expected
profits from trading at t 1 when playing the pure strategies: AUr;1; A
Dð1;0Þ
r;1 and A
Dð1Þ
r;1 :
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The probabilities that U assigns to meet Dð1Þ; Dð0Þ and Dð 1Þ; respectively, are by
Bayes’ rule, Prðq0 1jq1 1Þ 1324; Prðq0 0jq1 1Þ 14 and Prðq0 1jq1 1Þ
5
24
: If dealer U sets A such that 5
3
oAo 35
19
; then his expected profits from trading are:
13
24
ðA 25
13
Þ þ 1
4
ðA 5
3
Þ þ 5
24
ð1 GDð1ÞðAÞÞðA 1Þ.
Since these expected profits must be zero, it follows that GDð1ÞðAÞ 8ð3A
5Þ=ð5ðA 1ÞÞ: Similarly, if U plays A; with 35
19
oAo 25
13
; then his expected profits from
trading are:
13
24
ðA 25
13
Þ þ 1
4
ð1 GDð0ÞðAÞÞðA 53Þ.
Since these expected profits must also be zero, we have GDð0ÞðAÞ ð19A 35Þ=
ð6A 10Þ:
Consider now player Dð 1Þ: His expected profits from trading at t 1 when
setting his opponent reservation ask are 2
3
: Similarly, by quoting 35
19
; his expected
profits from trading are ð1 GU ð3519ÞÞ 1619 : Since these expected profits must be equal,
we must have GU ð3519Þ 524:
Regarding Dð0Þ; his expected profits from quoting 3519 are ð1 GU ð3519ÞÞ 1057 : By setting
a price A ! 25
13
; his expected profits from trading would converge to ð1 GU ð2513ÞÞ 1039 :
Equating these two values and operating, we obtain GU ð2513Þ 1124 :
To end this proof, we now proceed to derive the c.d.f. GU : We first compute the
expected profits of dealer Dð 1Þ when playing a selling price A4 5
3
: Differentiating
these expected profits with respect to A; the f.o.c. generates a differential equation
whose boundary condition is GU ð3519Þ 524 : The solution to the differential equation
yields GU ðAÞ ð3A 5Þ=ð3ðA 1ÞÞ; for all 53pAp3519:
Similarly, to obtain the last part of GU we differentiate dealer Dð0Þ’s expected
profits when A4 35
19
to obtain a differential equation whose boundary condition is
now GU ð3519Þ 524 : The solution to the differential equation yields: GU ðAÞ ð36A
65Þ=ð12ð3A 5ÞÞ; for all 35
19
pAo 25
13
: &
Proof of Proposition 7. By following the purported equilibrium strategies D gets zero
expected profits. To study the profitability of potential deviations we first note that
we can restrict our attention to deviations that involve setting prices ðA; BÞ such that
ðB; AÞ 2 ½1 DOS0 ; 1 DTS0   ½1þ DTS0 ; 1þ DOS0  as any strategy that implies setting a
price outside these ranges is weakly dominated. Note that any Bo1 DOS0 is payoff
equivalent to the strategy B 1 DOS0 : Similarly, B4 1 D
TS
0 yields strictly smaller
payoffs than the strategy B 1 DTS0 ; for any A and any ðAD
0
0 ; B
D0
0 Þ:
Given the equilibrium behavior of dealer D0; dealer D when quoting prices ðA; BÞ
gets expected profits given by
3
8
fPrðAoAD00 ; B4BD
0
0 Þ½A B 2DTS0 
þ PrðAoAD00 ; BoBD
0
0 Þ½A 1 DOS0 
þ PrðA4AD00 ; B4BD
0
0 Þ½1 DOS0 Bg.
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Since BD
0
0 A
D0
0 ðDOS0 þ DTS0 Þ expected profits above simplify to:
3
8
fPrðAoAD00 oB þ DOS0 þ DTS0 Þ½A B 2DTS0 
þ PrðAD00 4maxfA; B þ DOS0 þ DTS0 gÞ½A 1 DOS0 
þ PrðAD00 ominfA; B þ DOS0 þ DTS0 gÞ½1 DOS0 Bg.
To compute these expected profits we cluster all possible deviations into two groups:1. Deviations that involve price strategies ðA; BÞ such that A BpDOS0 þ DTS0 ; and
OS TS2. Deviations that involve price strategies ðA; BÞ such that A B4D0 þ D0 :
If (1) holds, then expected profits simplify to
3
8ðDOS0 DTS0 Þ
fðB þ DOS0 þ DTS0 AÞ½A B 2DTS0 
þ ð1 DTS0 BÞðA 1 DOS0 Þ þ ðA 1 DTS0 Þð1 DOS0 BÞg.
Differentiating the expression above with respect to A and B yields
qEðPTÞ
qA
3
4ðDOS0 DTS0 Þ
ð1þ DTS0 AÞo0; for all A41þ DTS0
and
qEðPTÞ
qB
3
4ðDOS0 DTS0 Þ
ð1 DTS0 BÞ40; for all Bo1 DTS0 .
Expected profits are maximized at the purported equilibrium strategy. Hence, no
deviation such as the one proposed above is profitable for dealer D.
If (2) holds, then the probability of attending both sides of the market is zero.
Consequently, expected profits simplify to
3
8ðDOS0 DTS0 Þ
fðA 1 DOS0 Þ2 þ ð1 DOS0 BÞ2g,
which is always negative. Consequently, these deviations are not profitable either.
Consider now dealer D0: By following the purported equilibrium strategies he gets
zero expected profits and he does not attend any side of the market. To attend it, he
must set AD
0
0 o1þ DTS0 and/or BD
0
0 41 D
TS
0 : If he improves only one price, for
instance the ask price, then he obtains negative expected profits since AD
0
0 o1þ DOS0 :
Otherwise, he also obtains negative expected profits because of
AD
0
0 B
D0
0 o2DTS0 : &
Proof of Corollary 9. Let STt ðSOt Þ denote the expected spread at t in the post trade
transparent (opaque) market, with t 0; 1: On the one hand, Proposition 1 implies
that ST0
4
3 and S
T
1
40
39 : Hence, S
T
0 S
T
140: On the other hand, from Propositions
7 and 8, we have SO0
71
72
and SO1 1:636: Note that S
O
0 S
O
1o0; as claimed. &
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Proof of Corollary 11. Consider the transparent market. The martingale property of
transaction prices with respect to public information directly follows from the law of
iterated expectations. The martingale property dictates that prices are semi strong
form efficient.
Consider now the opaque market. Recall that prices are given by
PO0 ðq0Þ 1þ DTS0  q0,
and
PO1 ðq1; q0Þ 1þmin aDðq0q1Þ1 ; aU1
n o
 q1.
Since there is one to one mapping between PO0 and q0; it follows that
EðPO1 jPO0 Þ EðPO1 jq0Þ:33
Suppose now that q0 1: Notice that
AO1 ð1Þ 1þ aU1 and BO1 ð1Þ 1 min aDð1Þ1 ; aU1
n o
.
Then,
EðPO1 jq0 1Þ 1þ 1318 EðaU1 Þ 518 E min a
Dð1Þ
1 ; a
U
1
n o 
, (11)
where
13
18
Prðq1 1jq0 1; q1a0Þ. (12)
Using Proposition 6, it follows that EðaU1 Þ 0:875 and EðminfaDð1Þ1 ; aU1 gÞ 0:741:
Plugging expressions above into (11), using (12) and operating, if follows that
EðPO1 jq0 1Þ 1þ 0:426.
As 0:426oDTS0 0:493; we have that EðPO1 jPO0 ÞoPO0 if q0 1: Analogously, we
obtain that EðPO1 jPO0 Þ4PO0 ; when q0 1: Consequently, EðPO1 jPO0 ÞaPO0 : &
Proof of Corollary 12. This proof immediately follows from direct computa
tions. &
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